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Abstract: 
 
We provide evidence on the long standing concern on auditor conflicts of interest from providing 
non-audit services (NAS) to audit clients by using rarely explored NAS fee data from 1978-80. 
Using this earlier setting, we find cross-sectional evidence of improved earnings quality when 
auditors provide NAS, especially those related to information services. This is consistent with 
better audit quality from knowledge spillovers due to the joint offering of audit and consulting 
services.  Events related to the repeal of these NAS disclosures in 1982 are associated with a 
small positive stock price reaction suggesting no adverse economic consequences of withdrawing 
NAS disclosures. Further, following the repeal of disclosure requirements we find no change in 
the earnings quality of client firms. In sum, data drawn from an earlier time period suggest that 
auditors’ reputational incentives, possible synergies and knowledge transfers imply that NAS 
offered by audit firms can be associated with improved audit and reporting quality in client firms.  
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Non-Audit Services and Financial Reporting Quality:  
Evidence from 1978-1980 
 
1.0 Introduction 
In this paper, we examine if non-audit services (NAS) fees paid to one's auditor are 
associated with lower quality financial reporting using data from 1978-80. This time period 
provides a substantially different auditing and business regime than recent years when most 
research is based. Thus, we provide an early history analysis of a long standing regulatory 
concern that NAS fees create an economic dependence that causes the auditor to acquiesce to the 
client's wishes in financial reporting thus reducing audit quality (Metcalf Committee Staff Study, 
1977; SEC 1978, SEC 2000, POB 2000). A related concern is that NAS fees may impair investor 
perceptions of auditor independence (Levitt 1998). This presumption has led to banning some 
NAS by statute and regulation, regulation mandating disclosure of fees from such services and 
prior approval of services by independent directors, and most recently to the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
of 2002 (SOX) banning the provision of most NAS to audit clients. However, there are economic 
benefits to combining NAS with audit services.  Knowledge spillovers between NAS and auditing 
allow auditors greater insights into their clients, improving audit quality and making auditors 
efficient providers of NAS (Cohen Commission 1978; Simunic 1984). Moreover, reputational 
concerns and litigation risk provide incentives for auditors to maintain their independence and 
check deterioration in audit quality (Watts and Zimmerman 1983).   
In June 1978, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 250 (SEC 1978) that 
required, for the first time, proxy statement disclosure of non-audit fee information.  ASR No. 
250 was rescinded effective February 1982.  The (fiscal) years 1978-1980 therefore represent the 
only time period, other than during a brief period in 2001 (for FY 2000), when companies were 
required to disclose fees for NAS paid to their auditors before most NAS was prohibited by SOX.   
The 1978-80 setting has unique institutional characteristics that allow for powerful tests 
to identify costs and benefits of providing NAS for the following reasons (we expand on these in 
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section 2.2). In 1972, the AICPA removed the ban on competitive bidding from its Code of Ethics 
under pressure from the Department of Justice (DOJ) (Zeff, 2003; Kinney, 2005). By 1979, the 
DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had pressured the AICPA to drop its rules 
prohibiting direct, uninvited solicitation, competitive bidding, and informational advertising. 
These rules had “provided a measure of price protection and reduced cost pressures among audit 
firms.” (Kinney 2005, pp. 91). Kinney (1988) notes that the changes, starting in 1972 created an 
increasingly competitive audit market and are described as “cut-throat” and as one with “vigorous 
price cutting” by market observers quoted in Zeff (2003). Consistent with this, Maher et al, 
(1992) document a significant decrease in audit fees between 1977 and 1981. Further, the audit 
industry was less concentrated and hence more competitive in 1978-80 compared to later years. 
The greater price competition increased the threats to independence by providing NAS.  
Second, consulting services were a more integral part of the audit firms in the 1970’s in 
contrast to the relatively independent and sometimes antagonistic relationship between auditing 
and consulting units in the late 1990’s increasing the likelihood that auditors accommodated 
clients due to NAS fees (Francis, 2006).1 Third, information systems (IS) consulting was the 
biggest component of NAS during 1978-80 (25% in our sample).2
                                                 
1 Andersen Consulting was engaged in a bitter dispute with Arthur Andersen & Co since 1997 ending in a 
separation decision in August 2000. Other big auditors also separated their consulting divisions in early 
2000s (Ernst & Young sold consulting business to Cap Gemini in 2000, PwC sold its consulting business to 
IBM in 2002, and KPMG consulting spun-off as Bearing Point in January 2000)  
2 In contrast Kinney, Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find that only 5% of public firms bought any information 
system related services from their auditors by the late 1990s. 
  Information systems related 
fees (ISFEE) represent the largest component of NAS in our sample and are of particular concern 
to regulators because they create a situation where “auditors are functioning as management, or 
may result in an auditor auditing his or her own work” (SEC 2000).  However, this is also the 
area with the largest possible spillover benefits - audit firms argue that IS consulting helps 
improve financial reporting quality by improving their access to technology, expanding their 
understanding of the clients business, and aiding personnel recruiting efforts (SEC 2000). 
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Consistent with the SEC’s formulation and prior work, we use two proxies for the 
strength of the economic bond between the auditor and their clients: (i) the ratio of non-audit fees 
to total fees (NAS); (ii) the extent of fees paid for IS consulting.3
One advantage of the 1978-80 setting is that it provides a unique opportunity to exploit 
the repeal of disclosure requirements to re-examine auditor NAS fee dependence. We do this in 
  We employ three proxies for 
the quality of financial reporting: (i) the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals; (ii) the 
likelihood of reporting a small earnings surprise; and (iii) earnings informativeness for stock 
returns. Concerns about NAS relate to both loss of independence in fact (resulting from the state 
of mind of the auditor) and loss of independence in appearance (in the mind of a third party e.g., 
an investor). We test for both these constructs – the first two measures above relate to the effect 
of actual reduction in earnings quality (loss of independence in fact) and the third relates to 
investor perceptions of lower earnings quality (loss of independence in appearance). 
We find that NAS are associated with better quality financial reporting - lower earnings 
management and higher earnings informativeness. In particular, we find (i) a significant negative 
association between NAS and the likelihood of reporting a small earnings surprise; (ii) a 
significant negative association of ISFEE with both absolute discretionary accruals and the 
likelihood of reporting a small earnings surprise; and (iii) a positive relationship between both 
NAS and ISFEE and earnings informativeness.   Collectively, these results are consistent with the 
reputation and knowledge spillover hypotheses and are contrary to the economic dependence 
view (whether in fact or in appearance). Further, even as the use of auditors in IS consulting was 
more widespread in 1978-80 than in recent years, ISFEE is associated with higher quality 
earnings supporting the knowledge spillover argument.  However, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that firms that want good financial reporting also buy IS services from their auditor.   
                                                 
3 When “non-audit fees become large relative to audit fees, auditor independence may be at risk.” SEC 
(2000). Further Kinney et al., (2004) conjecture that "regulators seem not to be concerned that audit fees 
might be too high or that the audit fee itself might establish economic dependence for the auditor," citing 
the SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner's statements on the effect of high audit fees itself. 
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two ways.  First, we assess stock price reaction around events related to the repeal of ASR 250. If 
the repeal of NAS disclosure is trivial, we expect no stock price reaction around these events.  
However, if investors perceived that the disclosure of NAS fee prevents economic dependence, 
then we expect a negative stock price reactions around these events.  Instead, we document a 
small positive reaction around the events related to the repeal of ASR 250 suggesting that the 
economic dependence view is not supported.   
Second, we examine if NAS fee disclosure disciplined firms to provide higher quality 
audits by testing if firms lowered earnings quality after the fee disclosure stopped compared to 
before.  Audit firms continued to offer NAS after the disclosure stopped.  If the fee disclosure 
prevented earnings management, we expect to observe lower earnings quality after the disclosure 
repeal especially for firms that had earlier reported higher NAS fees. We compare earnings 
quality in FY 1982-84 to earnings quality in the earlier ASR 250 time period. We find that firms 
that report higher levels of IS fees before the repeal actually have lower earnings management 
after the repeal. Our results provide no evidence that earnings quality is lower, after the repeal 
than before, on average or for the sample of firms that reported higher NAS fee dependence. 
Our study contributes to research on auditor fee dependence by providing NAS in two 
ways.  First, our paper is a "time dated" or "early history" analysis under a substantially different 
auditing and business environment compared to the turn of the century when most of the data 
underlying current work are drawn from.  We apply empirical methods for measuring accounting 
quality (such as absolute abnormal accruals, propensity to report small positive earnings 
surprises, associations between returns and earnings) that developed later in the literature on data 
from 1978-1980.  Even with the benefit of such hindsight, we do not find evidence that NAS 
compromise auditor independence in fact or in appearance as measured by resulting accounting 
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quality. This inference is consistent with studies that use the 2000 NAS data and enables us to 
present a historical perspective on the regulatory ban on NAS enacted recently.4
 Concerns on compromised audit quality as a result of NAS grew alongside the growth in 
NAS business. In its 1957 annual report, the SEC voiced early concerns about the breadth of 
    
Second, our paper is unique among available studies of NAS and economic dependence 
in investigating the implications of a repeal of disclosures of non-audit fees. The rescinding of 
ASR 250 provides a unique opportunity to examine market reaction to the repeal of disclosure 
requirements and earnings quality when fee information was no longer disclosed. These tests are 
not feasible using data from the recent time period because no restrictions have been withdrawn 
since the 1980s.  
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional 
background, unique features of NAS data from the earlier period, and outlines the hypotheses. 
Section 3 discusses the data and the primary earnings quality results. Section 4 presents analyses 
using the repeal of ASR 250. Section 5 presents additional analyses, and Section 6 concludes. 
2.0 Institutional Background, Prior Research and Hypotheses 
2.1 History of auditor provided NAS and related concerns 
 Zeff (2003) documents that as early as 1910s, accounting firms provided consulting 
services such as the installation of factory cost systems, studies of organizational efficiency, 
services related to investments in other businesses, and other services along with audits. 
Following the Second World War, these included information based services that grew by the 
mid 1950s to include operations research and electronic data processing. The growth in 
computing technology provided increasing opportunities for extending such services. For Arthur 
Andersen, such non audit services accounted for about a fourth of total business by 1969. 
                                                 
4 Using 2000-2001 data, the only evidence of a negative relation between NAS and earnings quality is 
shown by Frankel et al. (2002) and only for a few of several tests.  Subsequent research has clarified the 
limited nature of the Frankel et al. (2002) findings (Defond et al., 2002; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; 
Ashbaugh et al., 2003).  Also, Kinney et al. (2004) find a positive relation between tax consulting and 
earnings quality.  
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services offered by auditors and in 1959 the SEC Chief Accountant expressed concern that 
auditors would lose their objectivity if they provided management advisory services (POB, 2000). 
Business scandals in the late 1960s led to charges that auditor independence was compromised 
due to consulting services (Briloff, 1972). In an academic study, Mautz and Sharaf (1961) 
concluded that management and tax services cloud the appearance of independence. The 1969 
AICPA report on auditor independence (AICPA, 1969) found no evidence that NAS impairs 
independence in fact but that some users may perceive an appearance of lack of independence. 
Consulting increasingly became a concern for regulators in the 1970s as is discussed next.  
2.2 Developments leading to ASR 250 
In this section, we describe the institutional developments leading to the passage of ASR 
250 in 1978.  In particular, four events were relevant: (i) accounting scandals in the early 1970s; 
(ii) extensive price competition; (iii) regulatory concerns over NAS; and (iv) early attempts to 
split auditing from consulting as a response to ASR 250 and subsequently issued ASR 264.   
2.2.1 Scandals raise concerns about auditor independence 
Zeff (2003) reports that the collapse of Equity Funding in 1973, coming soon after the 
Stirling Homex bankruptcy a year earlier jolted the auditing industry (Report of the Special 
Committee on Equity Funding 1975; Seidler, Andrews and Epstein1977).  These scandals 
resulted in two Congressional inquiries, led by Rep. John. E. Moss and Senator Lee Metcalf, that 
questioned the independence of the auditors from their clients.  For instance, in 1977, the Senate 
Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management (The Metcalf subcommittee) 
recommended “that the independent auditor of a publicly owned corporation perform only 
services directly related to accounting.  Non-accounting management services such as executive 
recruitment, marketing analysis, plant layout, product analysis and actuarial services be 
discontinued.”  In response to the increased attention, the AICPA increased self-regulation, 
forming an SEC practice section (SECPS), required peer reviews of auditors, and set up the 
Public Oversight Board (POB) (in many respects similar to PCAOB established after SOX) to 
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oversee the SECPS and the peer reviews. The AICPA issued the Cohen Commission report in 
1978 which recommended that the board of directors or the audit committee of the client be 
informed of all services provided by the auditor (however prior approval was not required). The 
SECPS required this disclosure as a membership requirement. 
2.2.2 Extensive price competition  
Kinney (2005) reports that, in 1970s, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) were trying to increase competition in all professions by getting professional 
organizations to eliminate from their codes of professional behavior elements that were 
considered as violating federal anti-trust laws.  Such pressure led the AICPA to repeal the Code 
of Professional Conduct ban on competitive bidding for and uninvited solicitation of new audit 
clients and restrictions on practices such as contingent fees, advertising, and commissions.5  As a 
result, price competition increased as audit firms openly competed for audits and NAS.6
 The SEC blamed provision of management advisory services for the perceived decline in 
auditor independence in the late 1970s (SEC, 1978).  Consequently, the SEC issued ASR No. 
250, in June 1978, requiring companies to disclose non-audit services provided by its auditor in 
  
Bowman (1985, 705, 713) documents tenders of between 25 and 50 percent under the previous 
year’s audit fee charged by a company in the early 1980s.  Zeff (2003) reports that while earlier 
clients prized audit quality, they now began to view the audit as a commodity.  Maher et al., 
(1992) document a steep decline in audit fees between 1977 and 1981 which they attribute to the 
increased competition. Such pricing pressure and the desire to retain their audit clients may lead 
audit partners to compromise audit quality.  If these concerns about deteriorating audit quality are 
valid, we expect to observe a negative association between financial reporting quality and NAS. 
2.2.3 Non audit services under scrutiny and passage of ASR 250 and 264 
                                                 
5 According to Zeff (2003), in 1922, the American Institute of Accountants (precursor of the AICPA) 
banned promotion by accounting firms and since then marketing campaigns for new clients did not exist. 
6 As an example of the competitive pressure faced, the Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations, whose members included IBM and Honeywell, contended that the accounting firms special 
monopoly status to conduct audits gave them an unfair advantage in the consulting business (Hayes 1979). 
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proxy statements filed after September 30, 1978.  These disclosures consist of total non-audit 
services as a percentage of total audit fees, the specific nature of non-audit services provided, and 
for those non-audit services amounting to three percent or more of the total audit fee, their 
percentages of fees to total audit fees.  In addition, disclosure of whether the board of directors or 
its audit committee approved the services was also required.  Note, in particular, that ASR 250 
does not mandate the disclosure of total dollar fees for audit services or NAS.  The SEC followed 
up with ASR 264 in 1979 cautioning that “the impact of auditor independence of potential MAS 
engagements should be of direct concern to the issuer and especially its independent audit 
committee” (AICPA 1997).  ASR 264 also provided guidelines that auditors should use in 
determining if their independence is compromised and was intended to sensitize auditors and 
their clients to the potential effects on auditor independence of providing NAS.   
2.2.4 Split between audit and consulting 
Zeff (2003) reports that reacting to Release Nos. 250 and 264, Harvey E. Kapnick, the 
chairman and chief executive of Arthur Andersen, proposed to his partners in 1979 that the firm 
be split into two: auditing and consulting.  He reported on his private discussions with SEC 
Chairman Williams, who, he said, would soon require all of the big firms to make such a split.  
The heated controversy generated by his proposal led him to take premature retirement from the 
firm several weeks later.  In August 1981, under a new Chairman, the SEC announced that it was 
rescinding ASR 264 and ASR 250 effective February 1982 reflecting according to Zeff (2003, 
page 204) “the new federal policy of deregulation under President Ronald Reagan.” 
Harvey Kapnick’s reaction to ASR 250 and ASR 264 also highlights that in contrast to 
the specialization and division of labor between the audit and consulting practices in recent times, 
these functions were more closely integrated in the earlier time period.  For example, the day-to-
day governance of Arthur Andersen (the firm with the largest NAS practice) was in the hands of 
the audit partner in-charge of the local offices.  In a typical accounting firm, audit partners 
controlled all budgets (including that of the NAS), salaries, promotions, etc (Stevens 1991).  The 
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close relationship between audit and consulting units implies that (i) the potential to 
accommodate clients due to NAS fees is greater; and (ii) any spillover gains due to synergies and 
knowledge transfers between the two units are also more likely.  Thus, the 1978-80 setting allows 
for strong tests of the competing explanations of costs and benefits of allowing auditors to 
provide NAS - if the beneficial spillover effect (fee dependence) dominates, we will be less 
(more) likely to find an adverse relation between NAS and financial reporting quality. 
2.3 Benefits of using ASR 250 data 
We believe the 1978-80 time period provides a good setting for examining auditor 
independence related issues on account of (i) extensive price competition discussed in section 
2.2.2; (ii) the focus on NAS affecting auditor independence discussed in 2.2.3; and (iii) the 
integrated nature of auditing and NAS businesses discussed in section 2.2.4.  Moreover, 
information systems (IS) consulting was the biggest component of NAS during 1978-80 (25% in 
our sample) relative to late 1990s (see Kinney et al. 2004) allowing us to conduct tests of the 
knowledge spillover hypothesis.  The SEC considers provision of IS by auditors as particularly 
worrisome and prohibited auditors from offering most types of information systems services 
(SEC 2000).  However, there are costs associated with using ASR 250 data for our tests. 
2.4 Costs of using ASR 250 data 
There was considerable Congressional concern regarding the functioning of the 
accounting industry in the aftermath of the scandals in the mid-70’s, some of which were 
mentioned in section 2.2.1 that resulted in the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977.  This concern could have affected auditor behavior in the 1978-80 period such that we may 
find no association between NAS and financial reporting quality. 
While the consulting business was a fast growing area of the audit firms overall business, 
it had not reached the scale of the late 1990’s.  As discussed later, our descriptive statistics show 
that NAS accounted for about 17.4% of total fees on average for our sample firms. Comparable 
numbers for the 2001 sample are around 50% (see Table 2 Frankel et al., 2002).  The smaller 
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contribution of NAS to total fees and likely smaller dollar values of NAS fees in the 1978-80 time 
period may potentially weaken support for the economic dependence hypothesis.  
While data availability during 1978-80 constrains us to conduct tests using the NAS/Total 
fee ratio, this measure is consistent the SEC’s view that the fee ratio is the relevant measure of the 
auditor’s economic dependence on the client. It is therefore a valid proxy for evaluating the 
SEC’s concerns regarding auditor independence.  Note that firms did not disclose the actual 
dollar value of the fee and hence we cannot conduct tests using the absolute fee amount.  Thus, 
we cannot investigate whether the level rather than the ratio of fees is the appropriate measure of 
the auditor-client economic bond as suggested by Kinney and Libby (2002) and Francis (2006). 
2.5 Theory of NAS and Auditor Independence  
The Economic Dependence hypothesis, underlying the SEC’s concerns of impaired 
independence, predicts a negative association between NAS and earnings quality.  In an 
attestation role, the auditor has greater power vis-à-vis the client since withholding the attestation 
can have adverse consequences for the client firm.  It is costly for the client to replace the auditor 
when there is a dispute about earnings quality issues.  However, the auditors’ desire to provide 
NAS provides the client with leverage over the auditor since withholding NAS business from the 
auditor penalizes the auditor without corresponding penalties for the client (changing auditors is 
costly for firms since it raises earnings quality concerns; withholding NAS from auditors has no 
similar costs since such services are available from alternate providers).  The clients’ power vis-à-
vis the auditor thus increases when the auditor provides consulting services.  Therefore, auditors 
are more likely to accommodate client preferences in the presence of NAS fees and this lack of 
independence will result in lower earnings quality.  
Two alternative hypotheses predict a positive association between NAS and earnings 
quality.  First, Simunic (1984) articulates the knowledge spillover hypothesis arguing that NAS 
improves audit effectiveness as a better understanding of the client’s business due to consulting 
services improves audit quality.  Simunic also finds that greater competition among audit firms 
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prevents the auditor from appropriating rents from such efficiencies. The high level of 
competition in our time period would fit with this scenario. Second, Benston (1975) and Antle 
(1984) argue (following Klein and Leffler, 1981) that reputation concerns among auditors create 
incentives for independence.  Provision of NAS allows auditors to invest more in reputation 
capital, which the auditor is unlikely to jeopardize to accommodate any one client (Arrunada, 
1999; Dopuch, King and Swartz, 2003).  If providing NAS services is correlated with auditor 
reputation (for instance, high quality clients hire reputed auditors for expert advice), we would 
expect a positive association between NAS and earnings quality.  Finally, concerns about 
litigation provide another incentive for auditor independence.  Since plaintiffs are likely to argue 
that NAS compromises audit quality, concerns of greater litigation costs provides an incentive to 
auditors to improve audit quality and we can expect a positive or null association between NAS 
and earnings quality. Hence, it is not obvious how NAS and financial reporting quality are 
necessarily related in the data.  
2.6 Prior research  
Prior studies that use ASR 250 data generally provide descriptive evidence and limited 
tests of the association between NAS and proxies for auditor independence (e.g., Beck et al. 
1988a,1988b, DeBerg et al. 1991, Glezan and Millar 1985; Scheiner 1984; Scheiner and Kieger 
1982, Parkash and Venable 1993).  These studies do not assess the association between NAS and 
financial reporting outcomes, which is the focus of our paper. 
Recent research has used the post-1999 fee disclosure to examine the relationship 
between NAS fees and lower reporting quality. Frankel et al., (2002) provide the only evidence 
showing that the NAS fees relative to audit fees ratio is associated with greater earnings 
management as measured by discretionary accruals and a greater propensity to meet earnings 
benchmarks.   Subsequent research clarifies the limited nature of the Frankel et al. (2002) finding.  
For instance, Reynolds et al., (2004) find that the Frankel et al. (2002) result is only present 
among small to medium sized high growth firms in specific industry segments and Larcker and 
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Richardson (2004) isolate the NAS ratio and accrual relationship only in a small subset of 
smaller, management controlled companies. Chung and Kallapur (2003) and Ashbaugh et al., 
(2003) find that the Frankel et al., (2002) results are not robust to methodological weaknesses 
they identify. The no relation evidence is supported by Defond et al., (2002) using going concern 
opinions and by Ruddock et al (2006) using a sample of Australian firms and accounting 
conservatism. Further, Antle et al (2006), Ashbaugh et al, (2003), Chung and Kallapur (2003), 
Francis and Ke (2003), and Reynolds et al (2004) find no consistent evidence when the value of 
NAS or total fees is the independent variable instead of the ratio measure. 
Prior papers find no fee difference between restatement companies and a control group, 
for unexpected NAS fees and ratios (Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy, and Raghunandan 2003) 
and NAS fee ratio or frequency of NAS fees over $1 million (Agrawal and Chadha, 2003). 
Kinney et al., (2004) use a proprietary dataset of audit and non audit fees from 1995 to 2000 thus 
prior to the events immediately preceding passage of SOX in 2002. Kinney et al. is most similar 
to the present paper in that (i) it analyzes NAS fees by service type and relates it to financial 
reporting quality (proxied by accounting restatements); (ii) some types of fees (tax consulting 
fees) are associated with higher earnings quality (and "other" NAS is associated with lower 
quality), and (iii) it is also based on 20th century data and not fee data from 2001.  Overall, there 
is very limited evidence of a positive relationship between different measures NAS fee 
dependence and weaker financial reporting quality, evidence characterized by Kinney et al (2004) 
as scattered and modest.  
3.0 Data and Results 
3.1 Sample and data collection 
 Our sample consists of all firms that comprised the S&P 500 in December 1978.7
                                                 
7 Our sample firms comprise approximately 67% of the market capitalization of the entire CRSP universe 
for the time period of the study. 
 Under 
ASR 250, companies were required to report their NAS fees as a percentage of the audit fees 
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starting September 30, 1978.  These disclosures were discontinued in 1982 when the SEC 
rescinded ASR 250.  We hand collect data on NAS ratio from annual proxy statements for the 
fiscal years 1978-80 for 1,281 firm years for our sample companies.   
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 presents a summary of the magnitudes of non-audit services for all 
companies in the sample and Panel B provides firm-level descriptive statistics.  The mean 
(median) non-audit fees (NAS) account for 17.5% (14.5%) of total fees in the 1978-1980 period.8
                                                 
8 We convert the NAS/Audit fee ratio to NAS/Total fee ratio to maintain comparability with post 2000 data 
used in other papers. 
 
The economic magnitude of NAS during our sample period is smaller than the comparable 
numbers in the 2001 data where NAS accounts for 49% of total fees at the mean level (see Table 
2 of Frankel et al. 2002).  The service most frequently provided during our sample period is 
assistance with tax related issues - 79% of sample firms report tax fees, a number comparable to 
about 77% for non-restating companies in Kinney et al. (2004).  In terms of economic 
importance, information systems related fees dominate - an average of 14.6% of total fees for 
firms that disclose this fee separately (compared to 2% in recent data per Frankel et al., 2002) and 
25% of the firms in the sample report ISFEES separately (compared to 5% reported in Kinney et 
al., 2004).  The median percentages reveal a slightly different picture in that the highest 
proportion of total fees paid relates to tax consulting at 9.7%.  These statistics in comparison to 
recent data shows while that NAS services increased considerably since 1980, IS services were 
offered less by audit firms whereas audit firms retained their role in providing tax services at 
similar levels (but at greater dollar magnitudes). Untabulated results show that Arthur Andersen 
was the dominant provider of NAS in general and information systems, tax, and M&A services in 
particular for our sample.  Ernst and Whinney leads in H&R services whereas Price Waterhouse 
leads in legal services.  
3.3 Empirical measures of fee dependence 
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We use two measures of fee dependence.  The first measure is the NAS ratio calculated 
as ratio of total non-audit fees to total fees paid to the auditor and the second is ISFEE which is 
the ratio of fees paid for information services to total fees paid to auditor.  We consider ISFEE 
separately for multiple reasons.  First, ISFEE is the largest component of NAS (See Table 1) and 
by virtue of its size merits separate examination.9  Second, IS fees have attracted regulatory 
criticism and auditors are currently prohibited from offering many types of information systems 
services to audit clients (SEC 2000) due to the concern that corporate information systems are 
part of the firm’s financial reporting system that is being audited. In providing IS services the 
audit firm would need to audit its’ own work creating potential for abuse.  On the other hand, 
auditors argue that implementing information systems allows them better insight into the client 
thus improving audit quality.  This phenomenon played a bigger role in our setting since the use 
of auditors for IS consulting appears to have been more widespread in the late 70’s than in the 
late 90’s.10
We adopt three empirical measures of earnings quality (and therefore audit quality): (i) 
absolute discretionary accruals; (ii) the probability of meeting or beating earnings benchmark; 
and (iii) the stock market’s perception of earnings quality measured as the earnings response 
  Further, the consulting divisions were more closely integrated with the audit function 
in the 1970’s as the audit partners were in effective control of non-audit services as well (Stevens 
1991).  This suggests that economic dependence or synergy related outcomes are more likely to 
manifest themselves in the relationship with clients. Therefore, IS consulting provides a setting 
where empirical detection of any underlying relationship is more likely.  
3.4 Empirical measures of earnings quality 
                                                 
9 We also examine tax fees separately (discussed in the additional analysis section) since it is the type of 
service availed by the largest number of companies. However, tax services have not been considered as 
affecting independence by the SEC and have never been the subject of much controversy. 
10 As mentioned earlier, around 25 percent of our sample firms obtain IS consulting from their auditors. In 
contrast Kinney et al. (2004) find that only 5% of companies availed information systems consulting from 
their auditors in the late 1990’s. 
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coefficient.11
, 0 , 1 1 , 1 2 , , 1 ,1/ ( ) / /i t i t t t i t i t i t i tACC TA SALES AR TA PPE TA DACCδ δ δ− − −= + ∆ −∆ + +
 We acknowledge that each of these empirical measures of earnings quality and the 
market’s perception thereof has limitations.  For example, as Kinney and Libby (2002) point out, 
the benchmark measure categorizes all firms that meet or beat the benchmark as firms with poor 
quality earnings, regardless of whether the goal was achieved via earnings management, 
expectations management, reduction in uncertainty or improvements in operations.  Conversely, a 
firm that is consistently well below the benchmarks will be categorized as one with high quality 
earnings although the firm might have manipulated earnings by large amounts.  Discretionary 
accruals might just identify firms that engage in transactions that involve complex judgments and 
estimates.  Our hope is that different proxies for earnings quality will provide convergent results 
and thus reduce the possibility that the inferences are driven by method-specific bias. 
3.5 Multivariate analysis 
3.5.1 Discretionary accruals 
 Similar to prior research, we estimate discretionary accruals using the cross-sectional 
version of the modified Jones model (Jones 1991) to measure earnings management as below: 
   (1) 
where ACC = total accruals deflated by TAit-1 where accruals are computed as changes in 
working capital (∆Current Assets - ∆Current Liabilities -  ∆Cash and Equivalents + ∆Short Term 
Debt – Depreciation and Amortization Expense).12
We rely on the absolute value of DACC or |DACC| as our measure of earnings 
management because both income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals (e.g., cookie jar 
 TA is total assets at the beginning of the year; 
SALES refers to sales; AR is the accounts receivables; PPE is property, plant and equipment; and 
DACC is the discretionary accruals computed as the residual from fitting the model in (1). 
                                                 
11 We considered but decided against conducting two other tests.  First, Defond et al. (2002), investigate 
associations between the incidence of qualified opinion in distressed firms and NAS.  However, almost 
none of our S&P500 firms is distressed. Second, Kinney et al. (2004), examine the association between 
earnings restatements and NAS. Obtaining data on earnings restatements for our sample period is difficult. 
12 We cannot follow the Hribar and Collins (2002) recommendation of defining accruals as the difference 
between earnings and cash from operations because CFO disclosure was mandated after our sample period. 
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reserves) potentially constitute earnings management.13
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  Consistent with Chung and Kallapur 
(2003) we estimate the following model to assess if NAS fees are associated with |DACC|: 
      (2) 
where LnTA = log of total assets; DumCFO+ = dummy variable set equal to 1 if CFO (computed 
as income before extraordinary items less total accruals) is positive and zero otherwise. 
DumACC+ and DumROA+ are defined similarly to DumCFO+.  DumACQ is a dummy variable 
set to 1 if the firm acquired another firm during the year, and 0 otherwise.  DumISSUE is dummy 
variable set to 1 if the number of shares outstanding, adjusted for splits and dividends, increases 
by 10% over the previous year; and 0 otherwise.  DumLitigation is a dummy set to 1 if the firm is 
in a highly litigious industry, as identified from the auditor litigation database provided by 
Palmrose (1999).  The following industries are deemed litigious: mining (SIC2 code 13), 
manufacturing (SIC2 code 20, 33 to 37), retailing (SIC2 code 52 to 59) and financial services 
(SIC2 code 61 to 66).  Since the statement of cash flows was not available during our sample 
period we use balance sheet information to compute accruals. 
Following the method suggested in Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) to address 
endogeneity concerns, we lag the NAS variable by a year relative to discretionary accruals 
(|DACC|) and do not model NAS and |DACC| as a system of simultaneous equations.14
                                                 
13 Sensitivity analyses with signed discretionary accruals shows there is no change in our inferences. 
14 As we use lagged NAS in all our subsequent tests, we remove observations that reflect an auditor change.  
  Note that 
CFO and ROA are included to account for the correlation between accruals and these variables 
(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995).  Lagged accruals are included to account for potential 
reversals in accruals.  The dummies to identify positive CFO, ACC and ROA allow the 
coefficients of |DACC| to differ depending on the sign of performance.  The DumACQ variable is 
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included to address Hribar and Collins’ (2002) concerns that accruals calculated using the 
balance-sheet method (as here) are contaminated by how acquisitions are accounted for.  The 
DumISSUE variable addresses the concern that firms might manipulate discretionary accruals 
(Teoh et al, 1998) although this view is controversial (Ball and Shivakumar 2008).  Growing 
firms are expected to have greater accruals, hence the inclusion of MB.  Firms with greater 
leverage (LEV) have incentives to manage accruals to affect creditors’ perceptions of earnings 
performance.  To account for potential model misspecification arising from tests of unsigned 
discretionary accruals (Hribar and Nichols 2007), we include the control variable cash flow 
volatility (CFOVOL), computed as the standard deviation of operating cash flow for the 16 
quarters ending with the year of observation.  To control for litigation risk, we include 
DumLitigation (Matsumoto 2000).  Industry and time dummies are included to pick up any 
systematic patterns in |DACC| across industries and years.   
 If the economic dependence hypothesis were supported, we expect a positive β1 
coefficient on NAS.  A negative coefficient would be consistent with knowledge spillovers or the 
auditor’s reputation concerns or litigation risk mitigating the effect of economic dependence.   
Table 2 reports the results of estimating equation (2).  Column 1 presents the results with NAS 
and column 2 with ISFEE. Column 1 indicates no association between absolute discretionary 
accruals and NAS. Column (2) shows a negative and significant coefficient (t-statistic -1.81) on 
ISFEE and provides support for the synergy and knowledge spillover explanation. There is no 
support for the economic dependence hypothesis with either NAS or ISFEE unlike that in Frankel 
et al., (2002) and consistent with Ashbaugh et al., (2003) and Reynolds et al., (2004) who 
however find a null relationship as discussed earlier. To our knowledge prior papers have not 
examined ISFEEs and discretionary accruals. The coefficients on the control variables are 
generally consistent with prior work (Chung and Kallapur 2003; Hribar and Nichols 2007).15
                                                 
15 All t-stats are based on standard errors that are clustered by firm. Throughout our discussion of the 
results, we use a level of 10% or lower two sided significance to identify statistically significant results. 
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3.5.2 Meeting-beating earnings benchmarks  
Prior research documents that managers care about meeting or beating earnings 
benchmarks and use accounting-based or real earnings management to meet or beat these 
benchmarks (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999; Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal 2005; Mergenthaler, Rajgopal and Srinivasan, 2011).  If NAS fee dependence causes 
auditors to allow such earnings management, we would observe a positive association between 
the meeting/beating behavior and NAS.  Given that the data are from 1978-80, analyst induced 
pressure on managers to meet forecasts is perhaps less of a concern in that time period (Brown 
and Caylor 2005).  Hence, we only investigate whether managers in that time period have 
incentives to report annual earnings momentum. We examine annual as opposed to quarterly 
earnings because (i) auditor involvement with quarterly earnings is lesser than for annual 
earnings; and (ii) managerial obsession with quarterly earnings is often thought to be a 
phenomenon that intensified in the 1990s (Graham et al. 2005).  We employ the following logit 
model, where DumSURP is a dummy variable set to 1 if the firm reports a small positive 
surprise in annual earnings.  A small positive surprise occurs when the change in lagged annual 
net income scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1 falls within the range of (0.00 to 0.01).   
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1
6 , 7 , 8 , 1 9 ,
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−
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+ + +
 (3) 
Consistent with the approach in section 3.5.1 to address endogeneity concerns, we lag 
NAS by a year.  LnTA is included to address the possibility that large and therefore more visible 
firms are more interested in meeting and beating earnings benchmarks.  Brown (2001) finds that 
loss firms are more likely to report positive earnings surprises.  Hence, we include ROA and 
DumROA+ in the model.  Of course, ROA and CFO account for the possibility that better 
performing firms are more likely to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. Firms that acquire other 
firms (DumACQ) or engage in financing activities (DumISSUE) are more likely to positively 
 
 
19 
affect investors’ perceptions by meeting or beating benchmarks. We include a proxy for growth 
(MB) and the litigation environment (DumLitigation) in model (3) because Matsumoto (2002) 
argues that firms with high growth prospects and high litigation risk are more likely to meet or 
beat earnings benchmarks.   
If the economic dependence hypothesis were supported, we expect a positive β1 
coefficient on NAS.  Otherwise, a negative coefficient on NAS, as before, could reflect the effect 
of knowledge spillovers, concerns about auditor reputation or litigation risk on manager’s 
proclivity to meet or beat earnings benchmarks.  Results related to the estimation of equation (3) 
are reported in Table 3.  As before, columns 1 and 2 present the results with NAS and ISFEE.  
The results reveal a statistically significant negative association between the tendency to meet or 
beat annual earnings benchmarks and NAS and ISFEE (χ2- statistic on NAS in column 1 is 3.59 
and on ISFEE in column 2 is 5.14).  This suggests support for the knowledge spillover and 
reputation/litigation risk explanations implying that NAS improves auditors ability to prevent 
earnings management. Consistent with prior research, firms’ proclivity to meet or beat annual 
earnings benchmarks is positively associated with firm size (χ2- statistic on LnTA = 35.5 in 
column 1) and profitability (χ2-statistic on DUMROA+ = 13.25 and χ2-statistic on ROA is 12.2).   
3.5.3 Earnings response coefficient  
Regulatory concern about NAS arises not only due to independence “in fact” but also 
about independence “in appearance” i.e., the SEC worries that investor confidence in financial 
reporting is lowered by the appearance of fee dependence even if independence is actually not 
compromised (The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct Article IV, Previts 1985, SEC 2000).  
If high NAS reflects greater auditor fee dependence on the client and investors perceive this as 
lowering earnings quality, the informativeness of earnings as an explanatory variable for stock 
returns will decrease in NAS.  This is because investors reckon that managers in high NAS firms 
exploit their latitude in financial reporting to obfuscate real economic performance. If instead, 
investors perceive high NAS to reflect knowledge spillovers that are beneficial to the firm, we 
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would find a positive association between NAS and the informativeness of earnings for stock 
returns.  
Similar to Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995) we rely on the following empirical 
specification to investigate the relation between NAS and the informativeness of earnings:16
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7 , , 8 , ,
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 (4) 
where RET = market-adjusted stock returns beginning from fiscal month 4 and ending in 
following year fiscal month 3. RISK is a firm’s systematic risk computed using monthly returns 
for five years ending with the year related to the NAS disclosure, VAR is variability of earnings 
for the sixteen quarters ending with the year related to the NAS disclosure and PERS is the 
persistence of earnings as measured by the first-order autocorrelation in earnings for sixteen 
quarters ending with the year related to the NAS disclosure.  All other variables are as previously 
defined.  Similar to the earnings management tests, we lag NAS data by a year to allow the stock 
market to evaluate NAS disclosures available from the previous year’s proxy statements. 
 If the economic dependence hypothesis held, we expect a negative β2.  If the alternate 
hypothesis of knowledge spillovers held, we expect a positive or a zero β2.  The results of 
estimating equation (4) are presented in Table 4.  Column 1 estimates with total non-audit fees to 
total fees ratio as the NAS measure shows a significant positive association between ERC and 
NAS, as can be seen from the significant t-statistic (t-stat = 1.73) on the Earnings*NAS variable.  
Column 2 estimates are also consistent with this finding – the coefficient on the Earnings*ISFEE 
is also positive and significant (t-stat = 1.76).  Consistent with prior research (Warfield, Wild and 
Wild 1995), the ERC is decreasing in earnings variability (coefficient β7 is negative and 
                                                 
16 Note that we cannot conduct an event study around the release of proxy statements containing NAS fee 
data because the filing dates on the microfiche versions of proxy statements were unavailable in most cases. 
We also investigate the short-window abnormal returns surrounding the earnings announcement dates and 
found no association between earnings informativeness and the three measures of auditor independence.    
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significant).   The results support the view that providing NAS and IS enables knowledge 
transfers that can improve the quality of audits and hence informativeness of earnings.   
To summarize, NAS is not associated with discretionary accruals, lowers earnings 
management associated with a firm’s proclivity to meet or beat annual earnings targets and is 
positively associated with earnings informativeness.  The results using the information 
technology component of total non-audit fees – ISFEE, are also consistent with these findings.  
ISFEE is negatively associated with earnings management measured both with discretionary 
accruals and firms’ proclivity to meet or beat earnings targets and is positively related with 
earnings informativeness.17
The disclosure of NAS fee information can act as a deterrent to auditor fee dependence. If 
the market monitors higher fee dependence clients more closely, such firms are less likely to bias 
their accounting numbers. This monitoring role has served as the motivation for the SEC to 
require this disclosure and could be the reason for the null results obtained using post-1999 data 
  
Overall, these results support the view that NAS are associated with better financial 
reporting. None of the results in our paper are consistent with the economic dependence 
hypothesis, underlying the SEC’s concerns about impaired independence. Findings using more 
recent data show that NAS fee measures are not associated with lower earnings quality - the 
results in this paper go one step further by suggesting that NAS can in fact have a positive 
relationship with earnings quality.  However, an important caveat deserves mention.  Our tests 
document associations between financial reporting quality and NAS or ISFEE and not necessarily 
causal relations.  That is, we cannot rule out the possibility that firms that want good financial 
reporting also hire their auditors to perform NAS (or IS services). 
 
4.0 Economic consequences of repeal of NAS disclosures 
                                                 
17 Kinney et al. (2004) find no significant relationship between IS consulting and restatements but that 
result can be driven the small number of companies that avail IS services from auditors in their sample. 
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and our positive association results. In other words, behavior observed under disclosure is not 
representative of behavior when there is no fee information available. One advantage of our 
setting is that it provides us with the unique opportunity to exploit the withdrawal of the 
disclosure to construct tests of auditor fee dependence. We do this in two ways. First, we assess 
the stock price reaction of our sample firms around the events related to the repeal of ASR 250.  
Second, we examine our earnings quality constructs after the fee information is withdrawn 
compared to when fees were disclosed to assess if earnings quality deteriorated in the absence of 
the disclosure. 
4.1 Market Reaction to Repeal of NAS Disclosure  
 The repeal of ASR 250 was sudden, somewhat unexpected, and implemented rather 
quickly.  This feature allows us to study the stock price reactions to the events leading to the 
repeal of ASR 250. A review of the events leading up to the repeal suggests that three dates are 
worthy of study.  On August 20 1981, the SEC proposed a rescission of ASR 250 (event 1).  On 
September 9, 1981, the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA requires audit firms to report NAS to 
the AICPA in private communication instead of publicly reporting such data (event 2).  Finally, 
on January 28, 1982, the SEC formally rescinded ASR 250 (event 3). Assuming that the expected 
probability of the recession of ASR 250 increased on the above dates, we expect to observe no 
stock price reaction around these dates if the requirement to drop disclosure of NAS fee is value-
irrelevant.  However, if investors thought that NAS fees disclosure prevents auditor fee 
dependence, then we ought to observe negative stock market reactions around these events.  
 Table 5 presents market-model based stock price reactions for a three-day window 
around these three event dates.  The overall stock price reaction for events 1 and 2 is positive and 
statistically significant.  However, there is no significant reaction to event 3.  When we aggregate 
the stock market reactions for the three event dates, the overall market response is positive and 
significant but somewhat small (0.8%).  There is some evidence that firms with higher NAS and 
ISFEE actually experienced more positive reactions relative to firms with smaller NAS and 
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ISFEE.  Multivariate results reported in panel B, after the introduction of appropriate controls 
such as size, beta and M/B, suggest that the univariate association between stock price reactions 
to the event dates and NAS disappear as the coefficient on NAS is insignificant in column 2.  
However, we continue to observe a positive coefficient of 0.064 on ISFEE suggesting that prior 
to the repeal of public disclosure, firms were potentially purchasing sub-optimal levels of IS from 
audit firms.  Equally importantly, we do not observe a negative reaction to the repeal of ASR 250 
suggesting that the economic dependence story is, once again, not supported. 
4.2 NAS and Earnings Quality After Repeal of ASR 250 
 We examine if earnings quality worsened after the NAS disclosures were withdrawn. To 
do so, we expand the sample to include data for three years after the disclosure was withdrawn 
(i.e. fiscal years 1982 - 84) and repeat the earnings quality tests we conducted earlier adding a 
indicator variable for the post-ASR 250 time period (POST). Further, we test whether the 
deterioration, if any, is greater for firms that had reported greater NAS ratios during the 
disclosure period (DumHighNAS, measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if above 
median of last reported NAS/ has ISFEE). The regression for the discretionary accrual test is 
similar to equation 2 above.  
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 Similarly, we also test the propensity to meet earnings targets (equation 3) and earnings 
response coefficient (equation 4) by introducing POST and DumHighNAs into those estimations. 
 If we find lower earnings quality in the post ASR 250 time period, especially for the 
firms that earlier reported higher NAS ratios we would conclude that NAS fees were associated 
with lower earnings quality but the disclosure likely acted as a check preventing a deterioration in 
audit quality. However, in the absence of disclosure, audit quality impairment occurs. One 
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maintained assumption in these tests is that NAS ratios in the three years subsequent to ASR 250 
repeal stayed similar to the levels reported earlier. We believe this is a reasonable assumption 
since consulting assignments are multi-year in nature and do not change very quickly. 
 Table 6 panels A, B and C present results of the behavior of discretionary accruals, 
propensity to meet earnings targets and earnings informativeness tests respectively. Panel A 
results show no evidence that discretionary accruals increased in the POST ASR 250 time period. 
Further, there is no evidence that firms with higher NAS ratios in the ASR 250 period have higher 
levels of discretionary accruals in the post-ASR 250 period than those with lower NAS ratios. 
Both these results hold for NAS and ISFEE. In fact, firms with higher levels of IS fees report 
lower discretionary accruals suggesting higher earnings quality, similar to the results in Table 2. 
Results in Panel B are similar - we find no support for the fee dependence hypothesis for both 
measures of fee dependence. The propensity to achieve small earnings surprises decreases for 
High IS Fee firms in the post ASR 250 period again suggesting improved earnings quality. Panel 
C results suggest that earnings informativeness improved in the post ASR 250 time period with 
no difference between the high and low NAS (of ISFEE) groups. These results also go against the 
fee dependence hypothesis. In sum, the evidence provides no support for the fee dependence 
view; instead there is some support for higher IS fees leading to improvements in earnings quality 
in the post ASR 250 time period supporting the knowledge spillover hypothesis. 
 
5.0 Additional analyses  
5.1 Unexpected NAS 
Our analysis so far does not separate an expected portion of NAS from an unexpected 
portion because the expected amount of NAS that clients avail from their auditors is zero.  There 
is no need for a client to obtain consulting services from their auditor in a competitive consulting 
market and indeed they are zero for many firms. Any NAS from the auditor can be considered as 
unexpected. Therefore, NAS models do not have as much explanatory power as audit fee models 
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Francis (2006). However prior papers (Parkash and Venable 1993, Firth 1997, Frankel et al, 
2002, Kinney and Libby 2002, Ruddock et al. 2006) argue that some of the cross-sectional 
variation in NAS is a predictable function of firm characteristics.  To assess whether such 
predictable variation exists and if it affects our inferences, we employ only the unexpected 
portion of the NAS ratio as our proxy for auditor fee dependence.  Following prior work (e.g., 
Frankel et al. 2002), we estimate the following model to extract the unexpected portion of NAS:18
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 (6) 
where NAS = non-audit fees divided by total fees; DumBig8 is a dummy variable set 1 if the 
firm’s auditor is a Big 8 firm and 0 otherwise; ROA = income before extraordinary items deflated 
by beginning-of-year total asset; DumLOSS = dummy variable set to 1 if the firm reports a loss 
of net income in the year t and 0 otherwise; RET = market-adjusted annual stock returns; CFO = 
cash from operations divided by the beginning-of-the year total assets; LEV = ratio of total long-
term debt to total assets; INVREC = inventory and accounts receivable, deflated  by beginning-
of-year total assets; LnMVE = natural log of the market value of equity; MB = market-to-book 
ratio; DumSPECIALIST = dummy set to one (zero) if the audit firm has the largest number of 
clients in the two-digit SIC code; and UXNAS = the unexpected portion of the NAS ratio.  
In untabulated analysis, we find that the above model is only modestly successful at 
explaining cross-sectional variation in NAS with an adjusted r-squared of just 9%.  Consistent 
with expectations, NAS is higher in firms with larger investment opportunity sets (t-statistic 
related to MB is 2.05) and when the auditor is an industry specialist (t-statistic related to 
DUMSpecialist is 3.06).  Untabulated results confirm that using UXNAS, instead of NAS, does 
not alter our reported inferences. 
                                                 
18 Brown, Falaschetti and Orlando (2010) object to estimating UXNAS from contemporaneous data (i.e, 
most of the independent variables in equation 6 are measured at time t).  We estimated a version of eq. (6) 
with independent variables lagged by a year (t-1) and find results similar to those reported in the paper. 
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5.2 Tax fees 
 Gleason and Mills (2011) use Internal Revenue Service, financial statement and auditor 
fee data from 2000 to 2002 and conclude that auditor-provided tax services are associated with 
more accurate estimates of tax expense, consistent with knowledge spillover and contrary to 
concerns about independence failure.  In untabulated work, we repeat our analyses related to our 
proxies for financial reporting quality with the ratio of fees for tax services to total fees paid to 
the auditor.  We find no association between the three proxies of earnings quality  and the 
proportion of tax related fees to total fees. Thus, our analysis of tax fees yields results generally 
consistent with the overall result of no support for the economic dependence hypothesis.  
However, these results vary from those in Kinney et al, (2004), who find that tax fees are 
associated with lower propensity to restate earnings i.e., higher accounting quality.   
 
6.0 Conclusions 
In this paper, we use disclosure of fees paid to auditors for their audit and non-audit 
services (NAS) during the years 1978-80 for a sample comprised of S&P 500 firms to investigate 
whether high NAS fees relative to audit fees is associated with poor quality financial reporting.   
We find that greater extent of non-audit services is associated with improvements in 
earnings quality - lower likelihood of reporting a small earnings surprise and an increase in 
earnings informativeness. These results provide no support for the economic dependence 
hypothesis, underlying the SEC’s concerns about impaired independence. We repeat our tests 
using fees related to information systems consulting. Consistent with the knowledge spillover 
hypothesis, the results suggest that greater IS consulting fees are associated with higher quality 
financial reporting for all three proxies of earnings quality.  The positive relationship of earnings 
quality with IS fees supports arguments that this area of consulting improves the audit firms 
knowledge base leading to improved audit quality. Further, events related to the repeal of ASR 
250 by the SEC are not associated with a negative share price reaction suggesting that the market 
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does not fear an increase in economic dependence from the non-disclosure of NAS. Finally, we 
find no evidence that earnings quality deteriorated after the SEC repealed ASR 250.  
Tests of the association between earnings management proxies and measures of NAS fee 
dependence are a test of the auditor’s independence in fact while the earnings informativeness 
and the market reaction tests of the ASR 250 repeal are tests of independence in appearance.  
Evidence from the earnings management tests suggests that NAS and ISFEE appear to improve 
earnings quality and do not compromise auditor independence in fact for our sample.  The 
positive association between NAS and earnings informativeness and the absence of a negative 
reaction around the event dates related to the repeal of ASR 250 is consistent with no impact of 
NAS on independence in appearance either.  Our results on the beneficial earnings quality impact 
of non-audit services raises concerns that political interventional in the audit industry can 
adversely affect financial reporting quality in firms. 
Our conclusions are subject to the specific institutional features of the time period of our 
setting. The 1978-80 time period provides a setting where the auditors incentives to compromise 
audit quality were likely to be strong. The audit industry had just been opened to intense 
competition due to relaxation of ethics rules, the industry had larger number of significant players 
(but became more concentrated later), NAS services were rapidly growing, IS consulting was 
prevalent than in the late 90s, and the close relationship between auditing and consulting 
divisions in audit firms made it easier to lower audit quality for consulting fees. These conditions 
provide a good setting to test for loss of independence in fact and in appearance. Despite these 
enabling conditions, we find no evidence of lower earnings quality but instead the opposite. This 
allows us to conclude that providing NAS does not automatically lead to weaker audit quality. 
Since, companies disclosed only the ratio of NAS fees to total fees, our evidence does not relate 
to the size of the fees but does inform on the effect of the relative extent of NAS fees, which is 
the SEC construct of auditor fee dependence. 
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NAS fees were a smaller proportion of total fees to the auditor (17%) in our setting than 
in recent times (50%) and likely smaller in absolute amounts as well. The positive association of 
NAS with earnings quality we document could be a reflection of the beneficial impact of NAS 
when present in modest amounts. Therefore one cannot conclude that NAS are always associated 
with better earnings quality. Information systems consulting was more prevalent in our setting 
than in recent times and we find earnings quality improvements associated with IS fees. This 
suggests that the benefits of NAS are dependent on the type of consulting service provided by the 
auditor. This result is consistent with benefits from another type of NAS - tax consulting 
documented in Kinney et al. (2004). Governance mechanisms have also changed over time. ASR 
250 requirements did require audit committees to consider the potential loss of auditor 
independence from NAS similar to requirements in more recent time periods. However, audit 
committees were of much more recent origin in the late 1970s and were more likely to have 
inside directors - hence not as independent as in recent times. Despite this, we do not document 
an adverse association of NAS with earnings quality. Finally, we do not make any causal 
conclusions as we can only conduct tests of association.   
The predominant weight of evidence from papers that use post-1999 NAS fees data is 
that NAS is not detrimental to earnings quality. However, there are concerns about the 
generalizability of these findings. First, these are null results and do not document benefits either. 
Second, Kinney and Libby (2002) note that using a single year of data can produce idiosyncratic 
results. For instance, Reynolds et al, (2004) state that FY 2000 “was characterized by an 
infatuation with e-commerce, a merger boom, and IPOs tied to the new economy”. Finally, this 
was a period of intense scrutiny of audit firms by the SEC which would check any normal 
impulses to lower audit quality  (Antle et al., 2006; Ruddock et al., 2006). Our results provide a 
triangulation of the post-2000 results with evidence from a very different setting. The lack of 
earnings quality decline documented from very different institutional settings strengthens the 
evidence against deterioration of audit quality in the presence of NAS. 
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Watts and Zimmerman (1981) argue that “the onus of documenting that the existence of 
benefits from restrictions (on auditors providing NAS) exceeds the costs, is placed on proponents 
wishing to restrict auditors’ actions.”  Our paper provides another piece of evidence to suggest 
that there is no empirical basis for political intervention via audit practice restrictions by Congress 
and the SEC. 
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Non-Audit Service Fee Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
Variable 
 
No. of non-
zero obs 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
25th 
Percentile 
 
75th 
Percentile 
 
NAS 1281 0.175 0.145 0.125 0.091 0.237 
IS 316 0.146 0.083 0.159 0.044 0.187 
Tax 1011 0.116 0.097 0.085 0.057 0.153 
M&A 187 0.089 0.059 0.079 0.038 0.107 
HR 235 0.061 0.048 0.035 0.038 0.083 
Legal 47 0.069 0.065 0.037 0.038 0.084 
Other Consulting 264 0.085 0.057 0.080 0.038 0.099 
Other Service 713 0.050 0.038 0.039 0.021 0.065 
       
 
 
Notes: NAS refers to total non-audit fees as a percentage of total service fees. IS refers to the assistance in 
accounting systems installation and review, including all systems and accounting related technology 
services provided by the auditor to the company. Tax refers to total tax total of all tax related services. Tax 
services include (i) tax services provided specifically for Directors and Officers of the company, (ii) tax 
consulting and planning services provided directly to the company itself, (iii) tax preparation review, and 
(iv) assistance with IRS examination to the company itself. M&A refers to acquisition and divesture 
assistance that the auditor provided for any contemplated or realized company acquisitions, including sales 
of either divisions or subsidiaries. HR refers to the planning and examination of employee benefit plans, 
including fees for the planning and examination of all employee retirement, pension, and benefit related 
services. Legal refers to legal services and assistance rendered to the company by the auditor.  Other 
Consulting includes any consulting services (larger that 3%) that do not fit into any of the preceding 
categories. Other Services include services that on the proxy statements are shown in aggregate as a total, 
all together represents less than 3% of audit fees.  
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Firm Descriptive Statistics 
  
 
Variable 
 
No. of Obs 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
25th 
Percentile 
 
75th 
Percentile 
 
LnTA 1281 7.401 7.471 1.337 6.439 8.208 
LnMVE 1279 6.489 6.568 1.266 5.721 7.247 
MB 1276 1.198 0.981 0.734 0.712 1.464 
LEV 1281 0.183 0.177 0.123 0.086 0.265 
ROA 1281 0.074 0.069 0.050 0.043 0.102 
DumROA+ 1281 0.965 1.000 0.184 1.000 1.000 
RET 1262 0.011 -0.019 0.266 -0.176 0.181 
DumRET- 1262 0.517 1.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
RISK 1262 1.080 1.075 0.390 0.808 1.321 
EARNINGS 1272 0.139 0.147 0.126 0.103 0.194 
VAR 1273 0.660 0.309 1.090 0.171 0.661 
PERS 1273 0.320 0.300 0.380 0.039 0.622 
DumLOSS 1281 0.040 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.000 
DumSURP 1274 0.261 0.000 0.440 0.000 1.000 
ACC 1281 -0.026 -0.026 0.061 -0.059 0.007 
DumACC+ 1281 0.301 0.000 0.459 0.000 1.000 
|DACC| 1271 0.043 0.031 0.042 0.014 0.058 
CFO 1281 0.099 0.095 0.075 0.056 0.135 
DumCFO+ 1281 0.931 1.000 0.254 1.000 1.000 
CFOVOL 1275 0.037 0.027 0.035 0.018 0.041 
DumACQ 1281 0.232 0.000 0.422 0.000 0.000 
DumISSUE 1281 0.076 0.000 0.265 0.000 0.000 
DumLitigation 1281 0.456 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 
Governance 1281 0.509 0.508 0.286 0.259 0.757 
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Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics (cont’d) 
 
Notes: All data item numbers refer to the annual Compustat tapes, unless otherwise mentioned.  
LnTA is the natural logarithm of total assets (#6). LnMVE is the natural logarithm of market value of 
equity, computed as the computed as the closing price at fiscal year-end (#199) multiplied by common 
shares outstanding (#25). MB is the market-to-book ratio (#199 * #25 / #60). LEV refers to leverage, 
computed as the ratio of long-term debt (#9) to total assets (#6). INVREC is the sum of inventory (#3) and 
accounts receivable (#2), scaled by begging-of-year total assets. ROA refers to return-on-assets, computed 
as the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items (#18) to beginning-of-year total assets (#6). DumROA+ 
is a dummy set to 1 if ROA is positive. RET is market-adjusted annual stock returns. DumRET- is a dummy 
set to 1 if RET is negative. RISK refers to the firm’s systematic risk, computed using monthly returns for 
five years ending with the year of observation. EARNINGS represent earnings before extraordinary items 
(#18) scaled by beginning-of-year market value (#199*#25). VAR is the variability of earnings for the 16 
quarters ending with the year of observation. PERS is the persistence of earnings, computed as the first-
order autocorrelation in earnings for 16 quarters ending with the year of observation. DumLOSS is a 
dummy set to 1 if the firm reports a negative net income (#172). DumSURP is a dummy set to 1 if the firm 
reports a small increase in earnings, measured as the change in net income (#172) scaled by beginning-of-
year total assets (#6) fall within the range of 0.00 to 0.01. ACC is total accruals scaled by beginning-of-year 
total assets, where accruals are computed using the balance sheet method as changes in working capital 
[∆current assets (#4) - ∆current liabilities (#5) - ∆cash (#1) + ∆short-term debt (#34) -depreciation (#14)]. 
DumACC+ is a dummy set to 1 if the total accruals are positive. |DACC| is the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, computed using the modified Jones (1991) method as described in the text. CFO is 
operating cash flows scaled by beginning-of-year total assets, computed as earnings before extraordinary 
items (#18) less total accruals. DumCFO+ is a dummy variable set to 1 if the firm’s CFO is positive. 
CFOVOL is cash flow volatility, computed as the standard deviation of operating cash flow for the 16 
quarters ending with the year of observations. DumACQ is a dummy set to 1 if the firm engages in cash 
acquisition of another firm (#129 > 0) during the year. DumISSUE is a dummy set to 1 if the firm issues 
significant additional equity during the year, as indicated by at least 10% increase over the previous year in 
the number of shares outstanding (#25), adjusted for splits and dividends(#27).  DumLitigation is a dummy 
set to 1 if the firm is in a highly-litigious industry, as identified from the auditor litigation database 
(Palmrose 1999). Industries include mining (SIC2 code 13), manufacturing (SIC2 code 20, 33 to 37), 
retailing (SIC2 code 52 to 59) and financial (SIC2 code 61 to 66). Governance refers to a ranked index of 
the firm’s corporate governance, based on (i) whether if the CEO is also the Chairman, (ii) board size and 
(iii) ratio of external board members to total board size.  
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Table 2: Non-Audit Service Fees and Absolute Discretionary Accruals 
 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 . 1
6 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 1 9 , 10 ,
11 , 1 12 , 1 13 , 14 ,
| |i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
DACC NAS LnTA CFO DumCFO ACC
DumACC ROA DumROA DumACQ DumISSUE
MB LEV CFOVOL DumLitigation
In
β β β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β
γ
+
− − − − −
+ +
− − −
− −
= + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + +
+ ,i t t tdustryDummies YearDummiesδ ε+ +
 (2) 
 
Variable 
 
NAS 
(1) 
ISFEE 
(2) 
 Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) 
     
NAS -0.007 (-0.76) -0.018 (-1.81)* 
     
LnTA -0.005 (-3.08)*** -0.004 (-3.04)*** 
     
CFO -0.242 (-1.89)* -0.237 (-1.86) 
     
DumCFO+ -0.003 (-0.40) -0.003 (-0.37) 
     
ACC -0.338 (-2.35)** -0.332 (-2.33)** 
     
DumACC+ 0.007 (1.86)* 0.007 (1.91)* 
     
ROA 0.200 (1.52) 0.195 (1.49) 
     
DumROA+ -0.006 (-0.50) -0.006 (-0.54) 
     
DumACQ 0.000 (0.17) 0.001 (0.24) 
     
DumISSUE 0.009 (1.81)* 0.010 (1.85)* 
     
MB 0.004 (7.22)*** 0.004 (7.02)*** 
     
LEV -0.024 (-1.74)* -0.023 (-1.65)* 
     
CFOVOL 0.248 (4.37)*** 0.250 (4.37) *** 
     
DumLitigation 0.072 (4.15)*** 0.071 (4.21) *** 
     
No. of firm-
year obs 
 
 1260 
 
 1260 
   
Adjusted R2(%) 0.171 0.172 
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Table 2: Non-Audit Service Fees and Absolute Discretionary Accruals (cont’d) 
 
Notes: SIC2 Industry Dummies and Year Dummies are not reported for brevity. NAS refers to total non-
audit fees as a percentage of total service fees. ISFEE is the percentage of information service fee to total 
service fees, where IS refers to the assistance of installing and reviewing accounting systems, including all 
systems and accounting related technology services provided by the auditor to the firm. |DACC| is the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals, computed using the modified Jones (1991) method. LnTA is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. CFO is operating cash flows scaled by beginning-of-year total assets. 
DumCFO+ is a dummy variable set to 1 if the firm’s CFO is positive. ACC is total accruals scaled by 
beginning-of-year total assets. DumACC+ is a dummy set to 1 if the total accruals are positive. ROA refers 
to return-on-assets. DumROA+ is a dummy set to 1 if ROA is positive. DumACQ is a dummy set to 1 if the 
firm engages in cash acquisition of the firm during the year. DumISSUE is a dummy set to 1 if the firm 
issues significant additional equity during the year, as indicated by at least 10% increase over the previous 
year in the number of shares outstanding, adjusted for splits and dividends. MB is the market-to-book ratio. 
LEV refers to leverage, computed as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. CFOVOL is cash flow 
volatility, computed as the standard deviation of operating cash flow for the 16 quarters ending with the 
year of observations. *, **, *** indicates significance level (2-tailed) at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. t-
stats are based on standard errors clustered by firm.  DumLitigation is a dummy set to 1 if the firm is in a 
highly-litigious industry, as identified from the auditor litigation database (Palmrose 1999). Industries 
include mining (SIC2 code 13), manufacturing (SIC2 code 20, 33 to 37), retailing (SIC2 code 52 to 59) and 
financial (SIC2 code 61 to 66).
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Table 3: Non-Audit Service Fees and the Propensity to Achieve Small Earnings Surprises 
 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1
6 , 7 , 8 , 1 9 ,
,
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i t t t
DumSurp NAS LnTA CFO ROA DumROA
DumACQ DumISSUE MB DumLitigation
IndustryDummies YearDummies
β β β β β β
β β β β
γ δ ε
+
− − − − −
−
= + + + + +
+ + + +
+ + +
(3) 
 
 
Variable 
 
NAS 
(1) 
ISFEE 
(2) 
 Coeff  (χ2-stat) Coeff  (χ2-stat) 
NAS -1.079 (3.59)* -1.520 (5.14)** 
LnTA 0.334 (35.50)*** 0.326 (34.69) *** 
CFO -1.314 (1.37) -1.329 (1.36) 
ROA -9.198 (12.20) *** -9.029 (11.82) *** 
DumROA+ 2.888 (13.25) *** 2.883 (13.40) *** 
DumACQ 0.211 (1.49) 0.204 (1.39) 
DumISSUE -0.090 (0.14) -0.060 (0.06) 
MB 0.059 (0.19) 0.032 (0.06) 
DumLitigation -0.201 (2.01) -0.193 (1.86) 
No. of firm-year obs 1266 1266 
Pseudo R2(%) 0.137 0.137 
 
Notes: SIC2 Industry Dummies and Year Dummies are not reported for brevity. NAS refers to total non-
audit fees as a percentage of total service fees. ISFEE is the percentage of information service fee to total 
service fees, where IS refers to the assistance of installing and reviewing accounting systems, including all 
systems and accounting related technology services provided by the auditor to the firm. DumSURP is a 
dummy set to 1 if the firm reports a small increase in earnings, measured as the change in net income 
scaled by beginning-of-year total assets (#6) fall within the range of 0.00 to 0.01. LnTA is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. LnMVE is the natural logarithm of market value of equity. CFO is operating cash 
flows scaled by beginning-of-year total assets, computed as earnings less accruals. ROA refers to return-
on-assets, computed as the ratio of earnings to beginning-of-year total assets. DumROA+ is a dummy set to 
1 if ROA is positive. RET is market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns. DumACQ is a dummy set to 1 
if the firm engages in cash acquisition of the firm during the year. DumISSUE is a dummy set to 1 if the 
firm issues significant additional equity during the year, as indicated by at least 10% increase over the 
previous year in the number of shares outstanding, adjusted for splits and dividends. MB is the market-to-
book ratio. *, **, *** indicates significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DumLitigation is a 
dummy set to 1 if the firm is in a highly-litigious industry, as identified from the auditor litigation database 
(Palmrose 1999). Industries include mining (SIC2 code 13), manufacturing (SIC2 code 20, 33 to 37), 
retailing (SIC2 code 52 to 59) and financial (SIC2 code 61 to 66).  
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Table 4: Non-Audit Service Fees and Earnings Association 
 
, 0 1 , 2 , , 1 3 , , 1
4 , , 5 , , 1 6 , , 1
7 , , 8 , ,
( * ) ( * )
( * ) ( * ) ( * )
( * ) ( * )
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
RET Earnings Earnings NAS Earnings LnTA
Earnings Risk Earnings LEV Earnings MB
Earnings VAR Earnings PERS Indu
β β β β
β β β
β β γ
− −
− −
= + + +
+ + +
+ + + ,i t
t t
stryDummies
YearDummiesδ ε+ +
(4) 
 
 
Variable 
 
NAS 
(1) 
ISFEE 
(2) 
 Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) 
     
Earnings 0.889 (2.38)** 0.998 (2.66)*** 
     
Earnings*NAS 0.707 (1.73)* 1.064 (1.76)* 
     
Earnings*LnTA -0.024 (-0.54) -0.025 (-0.58) 
     
Earnings*Risk -0.124 (-2.58)** -0.115 (-2.37)** 
     
Earnings*LEV 0.527 (1.09) 0.450 (0.93) 
     
Earnings*MB 0.138 (1.12) 0.149 (1.21) 
     
Earnings*VAR -0.108 (-1.70)* -0.111 (-1.73)* 
     
Earnings*PERS 0.072 (1.00) 0.064 (0.88) 
     
     
No. of firm-
year obs 
 
1245 
 
1245 
   
Adjusted R2(%) 0.121 0.121 
 
Notes: SIC2 Industry Dummies and Year Dummies are not reported for brevity. NAS refers to total non-
audit fees as a percentage of total service fees. ISFEE is the percentage of information service fee to total 
service fees, where IS refers to the assistance of installing and reviewing accounting systems, including all 
systems and accounting related technology services provided by the auditor to the firm. RET is market-
adjusted stock returns beginning from fiscal month 4 and ending in the following year fiscal month 3. 
EARNINGS represent earnings before extraordinary items scaled by beginning-of-year market value. 
LnTA is the natural logarithm of total assets. RISK refers to the firm’s systematic risk, computed using 
monthly returns for five years ending with the year of observation. LEV refers to leverage, computed as the 
ratio of long-term debt to total assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio. VAR is the variability of earnings 
for the 16 quarters ending with the year of observation. PERS is the persistence of earnings, computed as 
the first-order autocorrelation in earnings for 16 quarters ending with the year of observation. *, **, *** 
indicates significance level (2-tailed) at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. t-stats are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm.
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Table 5 -- Cumulative Abnormal Returns surrounding the events relating to rescission of ASR 250 
 
 Panel A: Univariate Analysis 
 
 
Mean 
(t-value)  
Overall 
Sample 
n = 436 
High  
NAS 
n = 221 
Low  
NAS 
n = 215   
Difference  ISFEE n = 100 
No  
ISFEE 
n = 336 
Difference 
        
Event 1 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 
8/20/1981  (1.73)* (1.58) (0.82) (0.62) (1.46) (1.16) (0.80) 
        
Event 2 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.002 
9/9/1981  (2.55)**  (2.94)*** (0.74) (1.41)  (1.95)*  (1.89)* (0.68) 
        
Event 3 0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.009 0.041 0.002 0.003 
1/28/1982 (1.23)    (2.43)** (-0.88) (0.62) (1.15) (0.74) (0.75) 
        
Sum of 0.008 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.016 0.003 0.013 
All Events  (2.77)*** (3.83)*** (0.00) (2.75)*** (3.41)*** (0.86) (2.29)** 
        
 
Event 1 refers Aug 20 1981 when the SEC propose to rescind ASR250  
 
Event 2 refers to Sep 9, 1981 when the SEC Practice Section requires NAS reporting privately to the AICPA  
 
Event 3 refers to Jan 28 1982 when the SEC formally rescinded ASR250 
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Table 5 -- Cumulative Abnormal Returns surrounding the events relating to rescission of ASR 250 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis 
 
, 0 0 2 , 3 , 4 ,( )i t i t i t i t tRET NAS or ISFEE Risk Size MBβ α β β β ε= + + + + +  
 
 
Variable 
 
MODEL 1 
(OVERALL) 
(1) 
MODEL 2 
(NAS)  
(2) 
 
MODEL 3 
(ISFEE) 
(3) 
 Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) 
       
INTERCEPT -0.037 (-1.78)* -0.036 (-1.75)* -0.039 (-1.90) 
NAS   0.034 (1.57)   
ISFEE     0.064 (2.53)** 
RISK 0.018 (2.47)** 0.017 (2.32)** 0.018 (2.40)** 
SIZE 0.002 (0.79) 0.001 (0.54) 0.002 (0.82) 
MB 0.009 (3.54)*** 0.008 (3.11)*** 0.008 (3.34)*** 
       
No. of firm-year obs 434 434 434 
    
Adjusted R2(%) 0.041 0.044 0.053 
 
Notes: RET is the sum of the market-adjusted 3-day stock returns surrounding the three events relating to the rescission of ASR250. RISK refers to the firm’s 
systematic risk, computed using monthly returns for five years ending with the year of observation. SIZE is computed using the natural logarithm of total assets. 
MB is the market-to-book ratio. NAS refers to total non-audit fees as a percentage of total service fees. ISFEE is the percentage of information service fee to total 
service fees, where IS refers to the assistance of installing and reviewing accounting systems, including all systems and accounting related technology services 
provided by the auditor to the firm. All other variables are as defined in previous tables. *, **, *** indicates significance level (2-tailed) at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 6: NAS and Earnings Quality after rescission of ASR 250 
 
Panel A: NAS and Absolute Discretionary Accruals  
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , , 4 , 1
5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 8 . 1 9 , 1 10 , 1
11 , 1 12 , 13 ,
| | ( * )i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
DACC POST DumHighNAS POST DumHighNAS DumCFO
LnTA CFO DumCFO ACC DumACC ROA
DumROA DumACQ DumISSUE
β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β
+
−
+ +
− − − − − −
+
−
= + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + + 14 , 1 15 , 1 16 ,
17 , ,
i t i t i t
i t i t t t
MB LEV CFOVOL
DumLitigation IndustryDummies YearDummies
β β β
β γ δ ε
− −+ +
+ + + +
(5) 
 
 
Variable 
NAS 
(1) 
ISFEE 
(2) 
 Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) 
     
POST 0.000 (-0.12) 0.001 (0.21) 
     
DumHighNAS 0.001 (0.20) 0.005 (1.47) 
     
POST*DumHighNAS -0.002 (-0.58) -0.009 (-2.03)** 
     
LnTA -0.003 (-2.32)** -0.003 (-2.24)** 
     
CFO 0.076 (2.26)** -0.196 (-1.16) 
     
DumCFO+ -0.009 (-1.63) -0.007 (-1.41) 
     
ACC -0.026 (-4.35)*** -0.324 (-1.89)* 
     
DumACC+ 0.009 (2.43)** 0.011 (3.10)*** 
     
ROA -0.132 (-3.38)*** 0.148 (0.85) 
     
DumROA+ -0.006 (-0.89) -0.005 (-0.75) 
     
DumACQ 0.001 (0.52) 0.001 (0.49) 
     
DumISSUE 0.007 (1.85)* 0.008 (1.98)** 
     
MB 0.003 (4.44)*** 0.003 (4.10)*** 
     
LEV -0.010 (-0.75) -0.010 (-0.70) 
     
CFOVOL 0.346 (6.45)*** 0.348 (6.54)*** 
     
DumLitigation 0.006 (0.62) 0.006 (0.60) 
     
No. of firm-year obs 2677 2677 
   
Adjusted R2(%) 0.1981 0.2002 
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Table 6: NAS and Earnings Quality after rescission of ASR 250 
 
Panel B: NAS and Propensity to Achieve Small Earnings Surprises 
 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 8 ,
9 , 10 , 1 11 , ,
( * )i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
DumSurp POST DumHighNAS POST DumHighNAS
LnTA CFO ROA DumROA DumACQ
DumISSUE MB DumLitigation IndustryDummies YearDummie
β β β β
β β β β β
β β β γ δ
+
− − − −
−
= + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + + t ts ε+
 
 
 
Variable 
 
NAS 
(1) 
ISFEE 
(2) 
 Coeff  (χ2-stat) Coeff  (χ2-stat) 
     
POST -0.430 (4.15)** -0.416 (4.26)** 
     
DumHighNAS -0.138 (0.86) 0.219 (1.64) 
     
POST*DumHighNAS -0.169 (0.89) -0.430 (4.38)** 
     
LnTA 0.327 (59.79)*** 0.313 (59.28)*** 
     
CFO -2.491 (9.86)*** -2.532 (10.10)*** 
     
ROA -3.143 (3.13)* -2.949 (2.81)* 
     
DumROA+ 1.858 (23.09) *** 1.837 (23.12) *** 
     
DumACQ 0.038 (0.08) 0.015 (0.01) 
     
DumISSUE 0.018 (0.02) 0.034 (0.05) 
     
MB -0.021 (0.05) -0.048 (0.27) 
     
DumLitigation -0.250 (5.58) ** -0.242 (5.24) ** 
     
No. of firm-year obs 2677 2677 
Pseudo R2(%) 0.1182 0.1168 
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Table 6: NAS and Earnings Quality after rescission of ASR 250 
 
Panel C: NAS and Earnings Informativeness 
 
, 0 1 , 2 , , 3 , ,
4 , , , 5 , , 1
6 , , 7 , , 1 8
( * ) ( * )
( * * ) ( * )
( * ) ( * ) (
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
RET Earnings Earnings POST Earnings DumHighNAS
Earnings POST DumHighNAS Earnings LnTA
Earnings Risk Earnings LEV Earnin
β β β β
β β
β β β
−
−
= + + +
+ +
+ + + , , 1
9 , , 10 , , ,
* )
( * ) ( * )
i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
t t
gs MB
Earnings VAR Earnings PERS IndustryDummies
YearDummies
β β γ
δ ε
−
+ + +
+ +
 
 
 
Variable 
 
NAS 
(1) 
ISFEE 
(2) 
 Coeff  (t-stat) Coeff  (t-stat) 
     
Earnings 0.949 (3.18)*** 0.995 (3.41)*** 
     
Earnings*POST 0.163 (1.81)* 0.187 (2.37)** 
     
Earnings*DumHighNAS 0.103 (1.09) 0.089 (0.84) 
     
Earnings*POST* 
DumHighNAS 0.151 (1.38) 0.125 (0.83) 
     
Earnings*LnTA -0.056 (-1.72)* -0.053 (-1.63) 
     
Earnings*Risk -0.150 (-2.24)** -0.162 (-2.59)** 
     
Earnings*LEV 0.205 (0.60) 0.110 (0.32) 
     
Earnings*MB 0.103 (1.22) 0.114 (1.33) 
     
Earnings*VAR -0.065 (-5.50)*** -0.067 (-5.55)*** 
     
Earnings*PERS 0.045 (1.82)* 0.041 (1.56) 
     
     
No. of firm-year obs 2456 2456 
   
Adjusted R2(%) 0.1046 0.1021 
 
Notes: SIC2 Industry Dummies and Year Dummies are not reported for brevity. POST refers to the 3-year 
sample period following the rescission of ASR250. For NAS, DumHighNAS is a dummy set to 1 if the 
firm’s last reported NAS ratio prior to the rescission of ASR250  is above the sample median. For ISFEE, 
DumHighNAS is a dummy set to 1 if the firm’s report ISFEE prior to the rescission of ASR250. All other 
variables are as defined in previous tables. *, **, *** indicates significance level (2-tailed) at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
